In the last week of October, one of those streets had a man on it with a camera.
Abu Lulu’s name is Al-Fateh Abdullah Idris. He filmed himself executing civilians in El Fasher. Reuters has verified four videos of him, on October 27, shooting at least 15 unarmed captives. All of them were in civilian clothes.
He had been filming for months before that. In August, inside the city, he questioned a trader who owned a restaurant and asked the man’s tribe. The man said he did not know where the army’s commander was. He said he had a restaurant. Sudans Post and Al Jazeera do not fully agree on the name he gave when the question came. They agree on the kind of answer the question was built to pull out of him — a non-Arab person of Darfur — and they agree on what happened next. Abu Lulu shot him at close range. He told the camera that since the Rapid Support Forces had existed, he had never spared a prisoner. Not one.
He kept filming as the city fell. On a livestream he said he had killed more than 2,000 people, lost count, and would begin again at zero. BBC Verify recorded what he said to a man who was begging, and a fighter beside him who tried to step in. The captive had pleaded that they knew each other, that he had called out to him days before. Abu Lulu waved the fighter off. “I will never have mercy,” he said. “Our job is only killing.”
I keep coming back to the word job. Not grief, which would have had a dead person of his own somewhere behind it. Not a feud a family could tell you the beginning of. Not an order he could later say he hated and followed anyway. The job.
In the hours before there was an arrest or a statement, I watched accounts loyal to the RSF celebrate him. They called him faris, knight, and turned him into generated images, copper, a figure for a monument rather than a charge sheet. On the livestream where he boasted of the 2,000, men attached to the force called him a hero. Where there was anger, the anger was that he kept filming, not that he kept shooting. They were saying what he did was all right.
He had already done this in public in August. The handcuffs didn’t appear until the end of October, after the videos from the fall had gone around the world and the force needed to be seen taking account of something. A spokesman said Abu Lulu had never been inside the RSF’s command. An allied militia leader, in their telling, who had borrowed the name. There was an arrest, and handcuffs for the cameras, and a promised investigation.
Gedo Hamdan Abu Nashuk, the RSF’s commander for North Darfur, was walking with Abu Lulu on the morning of October 27. Reuters put him within 40 meters of two of the executions, in the same two-hour window. That same day the Centre for Information Resilience placed Abdelrahim Dagalo — Hemedti’s brother, and the force’s deputy — inside the headquarters of the 6th Infantry Division while the city was being taken.
The Security Council sanctioned Abu Lulu in February 2026, together with Dagalo and two other commanders.
In May 2026, Reuters reported that he was out and fighting. Nine sources described a release and a return to the front in Kordofan. Three of them — an RSF commander, an officer close to the leadership, and a researcher in contact with the committee charged with investigating him — said Abdelrahim Dagalo gave the order. Separately, another commander and a relative said he was released on the condition that he not film and not be filmed. Reuters did not establish that those were Dagalo’s words. The RSF called the report of a release completely false: he had remained in custody since the arrest, the force said, and he would face a special court with the others accused of violations in El Fasher.
They are arguing about where he is being kept. They are not arguing about the man who said he had a restaurant.
I used to think the worst of what this does to a man was his honest belief that he had done nothing wrong. The belief is real. I watched people mean it. What I no longer think is that the institution needs the belief. It can let fighters call a man a knight, and let a spokesman say the man was never theirs. If the sources are right and the denial is not, it can have the deputy commander free him and then tell the public he is still in the cell. He did not arrive over El Fasher out of nowhere. He is what a long series of reasonable decisions, each of them made in a room, leaves standing in a street.
I understood the rooms differently after I heard him. Not as what happens when fighters lose their heads on the day a garrison falls. The garrison was what the army was holding. The 18 months before it fell were pointed at something else — a population that would not be able to stay, or come back, or keep a market, or trust a hospital that still believed it was a hospital. They attacked Zamzam’s market in April. They shot the roads in October. The ward was two days after the dormitory. At the end of that, the roads are still there, and the gold is still there, and there are fewer people left who can stand on either of them and say the place is theirs.
That is hadr worked from the other direction. A government can spend generations deciding which of its people are citizens and which are only fuel, and some of the fuel will do the violence and experience it as the way the world has always been. Nothing in that sentence defends a dormitory or a hospital. It refuses the easier account, in which the evil of those rooms needs no past.
Abu Aqla Keikal commanded RSF forces in Gezira until he defected to the army in October 2024. Fighters under him are accused of mass rape in the towns they held. He is not a clean witness. In May 2025, in a closed meeting with journalists in Port Sudan, he said Hemedti ran the war himself — the calls, the ammunition, the uniforms — and that when the rapes were put in front of him, the tears came and the words did not. He said he had not commented on the silence. His office, the same day, called the published account excerpted and fabricated, and promised a tape. I have not seen the tape. I will not build a commander’s knowledge on a story his own office disowned. I will not pretend the story was never told.
The pay does not depend on it.
The RSF lacks the things that matter in an army here: wages that arrive whether or not you steal, and a court that can overrule your commander. Men who have worn the uniform describe being paid late, or in money the war has already destroyed, or not paid, and sent to take the rest from the battlefield — ransom, gold, whatever a town still contains. That is the wage, not a problem the wage is waiting out. Try Abu Lulu honestly, all the way down, and the tribunal has to ask his whole rank the question the videos already asked in public. There is not enough rope in Darfur for that answer. You would not be disciplining a fighter. You would be indicting the pay that keeps him facing your direction. That is the old meaning of militia, whatever it is wearing: it answers to whoever pays it this week, and both of the things it exists to do — fight, and extract — require that nobody above the fighter can tell him no and be obeyed. Darfur had not been given the courts the center was given. The RSF did not invent the absence. It enlarged it, from a province stripped without an accounting to a force that strips without one. The design held. The uniform changed.
One floor higher, the failure is different, and I won’t write it as if it were. Since 2005 the International Criminal Court has had jurisdiction over Darfur, on a referral from the Security Council. On October 6, 2025, three weeks before El Fasher fell — not during the week of the offensive — it convicted Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed commander, for killings and other crimes committed in 2003 and 2004. The sentence came in December. It is the only conviction that mandate has produced. In January 2026 the deputy prosecutor told the Council that her office assessed war crimes and crimes against humanity in the capture of the city, and was working toward individual responsibility. The lag is shameful on its own: a verdict about the previous war, delivered while this one was still starving a city, and a briefing months later still at the work of naming commanders. It is not the same act as killing people and then denying the count. The two acts land on the same dead. That is the charge. Coordination is a different allegation, and I don’t have it.
El Fasher was the last ground the army held in Darfur. Whoever held it held the gold there, and the roads out to Chad and Libya, and the buyers who have not needed to ask where the metal came from. The RSF inherited that use of the land. A buffer you can take from is worth more, to whoever controls it, than a buffer left in peace. I cannot make every line of that inheritance neat. I can say what stood at the end of the line. A city starved for a year and a half. A camp next to it where, months before famine was a word anyone official would use, the children were already being counted by the hour.